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BOOK REVIEWS 113 
Aquinas on Mind, by Anthony Kenny. New York: Routledge, 1995, Pp. 
182. $13.95 (paper). 
GYULA KLIMA, University of Notre Dame 
Anthony Kenny's book is one of the best of its genre, exemplifying the 
kind of introduction into (some field of) Aquinas's thought that endeav-
ors to make his ideas accessible to the philosophically interested contem-
porary reader in terms of such philosophical, scientific and everyday 
concepts with which the reader can safely be assumed to be familiar. 
Indeed, Kenny's book provides us with such a good example of this 
genre that it brings into sharp focus the problems of the genre itself. 
Therefore, while duly acknowledging the book's virtues of clarity of pre-
sentation, and its highly readable, almost conversational style, let me 
concentrate in this brief review on this problematic aspect of Kenny's 
book, as someone who is just as much concerned with making Aquinas 
accessible to a contemporary audience as the author is. 
In fact, my task is made relatively easy by Kenny himself, since at the 
beginning of the book he clearly points out the main source of the pri-
mary difficulty of his enterprise (16-18), although it is then all the more 
surprising how little attention he pays to this difficulty in the actual 
treatment of his subject. 
In line with Kenny's observations in this passage, Aquinas's thoughts 
on the human mind can by no means be characterized as providing us 
with just another interesting (not to say, exotic) theory in the field com-
monly designated as "the philosophy of mind" in contemporary philos-
ophy. For whereas the main problem of the contemporary field can justi-
fiably be described as the problem of providing a coherent, philosophi-
cally acceptable account of the relationship between "the mental" and 
lithe physical", for Aquinas this would be a pseudo-problem, constituted 
by a false dichotomy. The reason why Aquinas could react in this way is 
precisely what Kenny so clearly points out, namely, that the way in 
which Aquinas would delineate the realm of mental phenomena is radi-
cally different from the way modern philosophers would do the same. 
To put it briefly, for modern philosophers the realm of mind is the realm 
of consciousness, defined by the ("privileged") access self-conscious sub-
jects have to their states of consciousness. By contrast, what constitutes 
the realm of mind for Aquinas is the domain of the peculiar vital opera-
tions of a rational animal, and accordingly, the faculties or powers 
accounting for these operations, intellect and will. This of course also 
establishes a certain dichotomy between mental and non-mental, but not 
the sort of dichotomy between mental and physical that has been opera-
tive in the post-Cartesian tradition-for instance, pain is not a mental 
phenomenon for Aquinas, but speech is. 
Yet given this radical difference between the more familiar modern 
conception and Aquinas's conception of the very subject matter of this 
inquiry, anyone presenting their relevant thoughts should always be on 
the alert as to what we can or should take for granted in Aquinas's con-
ception, and what we usually do, but perhaps should not, take for grant-
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ed in the modern conception in these considerations. Indeed, this sort of 
alertness is required not only concerning issues directly involving 
Aquinas's obviously different conception of mind, but even in the case 
of such apparently absolutely "risk-free" considerations as the interpre-
tation of the term 'body' (corpus). However, for Aquinas the term 'body' 
functions both as the correlative of 'soul' (in the context of the claim that 
a human being consists of body and soul, whence in this sense of 'body' 
a human being has a body, but is not a body) and as the generic term sig-
nifying the substantial form of both living and non-living bodies, which 
in the case of living things is their soul (and in this sense of 'body' a 
human being is a body). So, failure to take note of these different senses 
of the same term leads Kenny to raise some totally misguided objections 
to Aquinas's conception, contrasting his view with a "strict 
Aristotelian", "hylomorphic" view. (25-28, 138-139, 150-151) Had Kenny 
taken into account Aquinas's explicit distinction between the two senses 
of 'body' in these different contexts, he could have easily avoided this 
pitfall.' But instead, he apparently relied on what might seem to be an 
intuitively clear notion, simply ignoring the implication of his own cor-
rect observations that what may seem intuitively clear to us was not nec-
essarily intuitively clear in the same way for Aquinas, precisely because 
of his radically different conceptualization of the issues under discus-
sion. Yet we may add that it is precisely this radically different concep-
tualization that might render the study of Aquinas particularly enlight-
ening for the modern reader, presenting us with a refreshingly different 
perspective on our own inquiries, teaching us not to take for granted 
certain things that we otherwise usually do. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said about Kenny's fumbled treat-
ment of the notion of phantasm (sensory information received, stored, 
retrieved and/ or further processed by the sensitive faculties of an ani-
mal), comparing it to what he apparently takes to be an intuitively clear 
notion of mental image, and then wondering why Aquinas at times 
seems to speak as if we had mental images in sense perception (38), 
why he seems to attribute mental images to animals (39), and in general 
whether he held "the regrettable theory that external sense-experience 
was accompanied by a parallel series of phenomena in the imagina-
tion" (93). Well, I for one certainly do not find this notion of "mental 
image" intuitively clear at all, even if I am of course familiar with the 
modern philosophical tradition that takes it for granted. Am I sup-
posed to have a "mental image" in my mind when I am listening to 
Beethoven's Pastoral, when I am recalling it, and when I am inventing 
possible variations of it; or am I just receiving, retrieving, and further 
processing auditory information? But then this may be just my prob-
lem. In any case, while on p. 37 we are informed that "Clearly a phan-
tasm is like a mental image. But the two do not seem to be entirely 
equivalent.", on p. 38 we can only learn that " ... he [Aquinasl did not 
mean by 'phantasm' simply a mental image". What we do not learn 
about at all is what we should understand by a "mental image", and in 
what way our assumed familiarity with mental images could be helpful 
in understanding Aquinas, given that Aquinas's theory apparently 
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does not have much to do with them, whatever they are. 
Again, considering Aquinas's conception of the immateriality of the 
intellectual soul, Kenny wonders how Aquinas could ever maintain 
that a form could exist without matter, save for his non-philosophical, 
religious beliefs, and "a disconcerting disdain for distinctions between 
abstract and concrete" (138). But it is rather Kenny's discussion that is 
marred by an utterly disconcerting disdain for Aquinas's own distinction 
between the different modes of signifying of abstract and concrete 
terms, and his analyses of under what conditions there are real distinc-
tions between distinct entities, indeed, distinct types of entities, corre-
sponding to this semantic distinction, and under what conditions there 
are no such real distinctions, while the semantic distinction still remains 
in force. 2 Instead, Kenny uses the garden-variety, but hopefully "intu-
itively clear" talk about "abstract and concrete" [terms, or entities other 
than terms?-Kenny never tells], so no wonder he ends up with blam-
ing Aquinas for confusion.' 
Many similar examples could be listed from Kenny's book,' but I 
think even the ones mentioned here should enable us to draw some 
quite general lessons concerning the whole enterprise of making 
Aquinas's thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical audi-
ence as well as concerning the place of Kenny's book in this enterprise. 
First, as should be obvious, we shall never understand properly any of 
Aquinas's theories without first "learning his language". However, 
"learning his language" does not mean just learning Latin, but rather 
acquiring the radically different conceptual apparatus encoded in his 
language, constantly reflecting on how this different apparatus consti-
tutes its own self-evident truths, while questioning the validity of what 
we take to be self-evident truths on account of the conceptual apparatus 
encoded in our philosophical language. Second, we shall never be able to 
communicate our understanding of Aquinas authentically unless we 
learn how to "teach his language". For if we do not manage to "teach his 
language", the best we can come up with is some more or less matching 
"translation" of his thought, with the appropriate footnotes on the 
defects of available "translations", and recurrent complaints on the 
"confusions" of the author, as is exemplified by Kenny's book. But in 
order to be able to "teach this language", we have to provide the appro-
priate "learning tools", that is, to put the whole point in less metaphori-
cal terms, we have to provide the contemporary reader with a descrip-
tion of the underlying semantics of St. Thomas's substantive philosophi-
cal theories, constituting the self-evident principles presupposed by those 
theories. The best passages of Kenny's book from this point of view are 
precisely the ones in which he remarks on certain principles of Aquinas 
that they should be taken as "truisms"-it is a pity that these remarks do 
not stand together to form a consistent methodology. 
In fact, it might seem preposterous that I should call attention to the 
importance of semantic analysis in connection with the approach of an 
outstanding analytic philosopher. However, as a rule, contemporary 
philosophers have the unfortunate propensity to take as the ultimate 
standard of the correctness of their (or others') analyses something 
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which is "intuitively clear", without any further qualification. But it is pre-
cisely the study of Aquinas that should make us realize today more than 
ever that what may appear intuitively clear, or self-evident to us (per se 
notum quoad nos) may not be self-evident to others, let alone in itself (per se 
notum secundum se)-whereas what is self-evident in itself, or at least 
what used to be self-evident to our predecessors, is definitely no longer 
self-evident to us.5 
In view of the above-mentioned troubles with Kenny's approach 
(and many others not mentioned here, but the reader may also wish to 
consult Robert Pasnau's review of the same book in The Philosophical 
Review, 4(1994), pp. 745-748), I find this book rather disappointing, not 
only from the point of view of the Aquinas scholar, but especially from 
the point of view of those students of Aquinas who think Aquinas's 
thought bears more than historical relevance to our philosophical con-
cerns. At the beginning of the book Kenny promises to show us 
"through a close reading of texts from Aquinas that medieval thinkers 
still have much to teach us about the philosophy of mind" (20). I sincere-
ly believe that medieval thinkers in general and Aquinas in particular do 
have a great deal to teach us about the philosophy of mind, so I find it 
particularly regrettable that Kenny never fulfills this promise. In fact, in 
Kenny's book, instead of getting the well-deserved role of our teacher, 
Aquinas gets chided at every turn when he does not quite meet Kenny's 
identifiably Wittgenstein-Ryle-informed expectations. Nevertheless, on 
account of the virtues of the book mentioned at the beginning of this 
review, I also think that despite all these shortcomings, with the careful 
guidance of a competent Aquinas scholar, Kenny's book can playa use-
ful role in an introductory course on Aquinas's philosophy of mind. 
NOTES 
1. Cf. for example, EE, c. 3; SeG lb. 4, cpo 81, n. 7; 1SN ds. 25, q. 1, a. 1, 
ad 2-um. Klima, G. (1997) "Man = Body + Soul: Aquinas's Arithmetic of 
Human Nature," in Philosophical Stlldies in Religion, Metaphysics, and Ethics. 
Essays in Honour of Heikki Kirjavainen, eds. Timo Koistinen and Tommi 
Lehtonen (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1997), pp. 179-197. 
2. For a detailed discussion of these issues see Klima, G.: "The 
Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of 
Being", Medieval Philosophy and Theology, (5)1996, pp. 87-141, especially n. 96. 
3. In fact, Kenny's discussion ofthis issue throughout the book seems 
to suffer from what may be called "the curse of J. S. Mill's ghost", namely, 
the implicit, but in contemporary analytic philosophy still prevalent (since 
presumably "intuitively clear") assumption that while concrete terms name 
concrete entities (i.e., particulars with genuine causal powers), abstract 
terms name only the attributes or properties of the former, which are pre-
sumablv "abstract entities" [universals?, entia rationis?-we never learn]' in 
any case, some quasi-entities without any agency or other sort of causality. 
(For Kenny's troubles see pp. 133, 138, 149. For Mill's analysis see "Of 
Names and Propositions", in: J. L. Garfield and M. Kiteley: Meaning and 
Truth, Paragon House: New York, 1991, pp. 8-34, especially, p. 17; also, note 
the easy shift from 'form' to 'attribute' in n. 8, on p. 33.) However, for 
Aquinas an abstract common term is the common name of the (ultimate) 
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significata of its concrete counterpart, which signifies the forms of those 
things which fall under it. But forms for Aquinas, even if they of course can 
be conceived and thus signified in an abstract, universal manner, are nothing 
but the individualized determination of some particular act of real being, 
and this is precisely why they are the principle of being and action in any 
sort of agency. 
4. Just to take one more example, from the chapter on appetite and 
will, consider Kenny's self-assured judgment that Aquinas's natural teleolo-
gy "is something which must be discarded if we are to make any use of his 
philosophy at the present time", on the hopefully "intuitively clear" basis 
that while the growth of a plant is teleological, the falling of a stone is not. 
(p. 61.) To be sure, Kenny deserves credit here for not assuming the other-
wise perhaps also "intuitively clear", but in Aquinas's Aristotelian frame-
work totally false and unjustified claim that all teleological activities must be 
conscious. On the other hand, he never even tries to consider how Aquinas 
may have held that even the falling of a stone is teleological. To that end, 
however, Kenny would have had to give a comprehensive account of 
Aquinas's theory of causation in the overall context of his Aristotelian natur-
al philosophy, which is again radically different from modern conceptions 
of causation. But since Kenny fails to do so, his account is misleading also in 
the subsequent chapter, where he simply classifies Aquinas as a "soft deter-
minist", as if the contemporary classification could be applied to Aquinas's 
theories without any further ado, despite the radical differences between 
Aquinas's and the contemporary concept of 'cause'. (pp. 77-78.) 
5. STl q. 2, a. 1; in Phys lb. 1, le. 1; in De Hebd.le. 1. 
The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. Pp. 384. $45.00 (cloth), 
$22.50 (paper). 
KEVIN MEEKER, University of Notre Dame 
This important anthology offers not only some significant new state-
ments of and attacks on arguments that purport to provide strong, but 
not conclusive, evidence for atheism based on evil but also a fairly com-
prehensive bibliography on the subject. In what follows I will summa-
rize some main themes of each essay and briefly reflect on a few central 
issues in the debate. 
The first two chapters formulate the most potent versions of the evi-
dential challenge to theism. Chapter One reprints William Rowe's "The 
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". Assuming that God 
would only allow evil that was (logically) necessary for a greater good, 
Rowe argues roughly that atheism is reasonable because it is likely that 
there are some instances of suffering that are not necessary for any 
greater good. In other words, because it seems that God (if such a being 
existed) could have thwarted the occurrence of certain instances of suf-
fering without forfeiting any greater good (or at least we see no reason 
why God could not have done so), atheism is rationally justified. The 
second chapter reproduces Paul Draper's "Pain and Pleasure: An 
Evidential Problem for Theists". Draper contends that theism fares 
